292: China's Decarbonisation Leadership: is Trump (accidentally) fueling Beijing's climate takeover?

Tom: [00:16:33] Okay, so we're now we're going to be joined by Li Shuo, the director of the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute and a senior fellow at the centre for China Analysis. He was former global policy advisor for Greenpeace East Asia, and he has a long history of being one of the world's deepest thinkers on the role that China can and does play on the world stage on climate change. Li Shuo, thank you so much for joining us on Outrage and Optimism. It is a pleasure and an honour to talk to you. And what a critical moment for us to be speaking in regards to China's leadership on climate change. It has been a very consequential few weeks. And if we weren't relying on China leading the world before, we very much are now. So we're looking forward to your insight and your analysis. And when we're speaking, we're recording this on the 14th of April. We need to timestamp everything now because we don't know where we'll be on tariffs by the time this comes out in 48 hours. But right now we are on 145% versus 125% tariffs between the US and China. This is obviously a different world to where we were a couple of weeks ago. And I would just like to kick off by asking you, have these tariffs created an incentive or a disincentive for China to step into greater leadership?

Li Shuo: [00:17:49] Well, Tom, I think that's a very good question to start our conversation. If I have to provide a short answer, my answer would be it doesn't really change or affect China's resolve that much. And the reason that I'm saying that is the Trump tariffs imposed on April 2nd. And since then, a few more rounds of tariffs will only affect China's commercial relationship with the US. The US is a pretty important consumer of low carbon products, but it is also one of the many consumers in the world. So I think in the short term, if the Trump tariffs stand and hold in the foreseeable future, we are indeed looking at a very extreme and bleak picture of trade and economic decoupling between the US and China, the two largest emitters and economies in the world. And this will have an immediate and significant negative impact on the US's ability to decarbonize. Because simply some of the lowest cost and highest efficient low carbon solutions will not be available to the US market. But at the same time, China will still be able to deploy its domestically made products at home. And I think increasingly, the country will be very interested in exploring other markets in the world, including the European Union, but also much of the global South countries.

Tom: [00:19:20] So that's interesting. So your calculus there is that this will have a very significant impact on the US ability to decarbonize. But in terms of China's ability to decarbonize, that will pretty much carry on as before, although obviously in a very much changed world. What will it do, do you think, to the internal political calculus being made by the government of China around the decision making that is being taken around climate leadership. Will that change?

Li Shuo: [00:19:45] Let me give you the bad news and the good news. The bad news is the following. You know, I think one thing that we need to realize on the Trump tariffs is that this is not just limited to a trade and economic relationship that the US will have with other countries in the world. This is a much bigger and more profound signal, right? A signal that represents a lot of unpredictability and at least in the short to medium term volatilities in the world, a signal that very much goes against the collective spirit of multilateralism. Right. A critical ingredient that we I think we can all agree that we need we require to move the global climate agenda forward. So that's the bad news. I think the good news is this also presents an opportunity for the rest of the world. R o w the rest of the world, I think, will increasingly become a major theme of all these other countries in the developed part of the world, the European Union at the very forefront. Uk, Australia, Japan, other countries and also global source countries. Well, this presents an opportunity for them to show their resolve. Will this actually catalyze their motivation to actually work with each other and work better with each other to maintain the climate momentum that we need in the world?

Tom: [00:21:08] Yeah, I agree with that. And what I would add to that, that very thoughtful rest of world comment is the way the rest of the world will respond is directly connected, of course, to how China responds. So if China sees this moment as an opportunity to say, we have been looking at broad shifts, and this is a moment where the world needs China to step up economically, diplomatically, in order to say, we are not going back on this moment, but we're going to submit a more ambitious NDC. We're going to step up, build relationships with Brazil. That will inject is my assessment, the momentum that's needed into this process? If China begins to go soft on this doesn't submit an NDC, then it will be harder for the rest of the world to continue with that momentum so that rest of the world's story has China very much at its heart. What do you see this year in terms of China's ability and willingness to occupy that leadership role that's now so absent?

Li Shuo: [00:22:08] Tom, I very much agree with what you just said. I think this year is critical for climate. Ambition is, of course, what a kind of NDC, these 2035 climate targets all the countries will present. Quite a number of large emitters still haven't made up their mind. And I think understandably, with all the volatilities in the world, they are weighing their options very carefully. For China, it is very clear that if they want to provide high ambition and support to the multilateral system, they will really need to drastically reduce their emissions over the next ten years. Based on our calculation at the Asia Society Policy Institute. It means they need to present NDC with at least 30% emission reductions between now 2025 and 2035. And I think in addition to that, how China will support the Brazilian presidency in the run up to the Cop, what kind of political and geo political support Beijing will bring to the Berlin Cop, and what will be the diplomatic relationship with other major climate powers in the world, in particular, the European Union, I think will also be a very important thing to keep an eye on.

Li Shuo: [00:23:25] But let me let me maybe just backtrack a little bit, Tom, when we talk about NDC climate diplomacy, Cop 30, I think we also need to realize one thing, and that is we are primarily talking about climate leadership. Climate momentum in the political and diplomatic sphere. One thing that I think we need to increasingly realize is going forward and with the Trump tariffs, climate leadership in the next decade or so will manifest itself in a slightly different way compared to the last ten years since we had the Paris Agreement. I think the economic aspect will really drive action or derail action if you don't handle your industrial policy smartly, if you don't handle your trade relationship smartly. So which country will win the economic race when it comes to producing and deploying the most important low carbon technologies in the world the wind, solar, electric vehicles, battery storage and so on. Which country is at the very forefront of that, I think will increasingly begin to define which country is providing real leadership.

Tom: [00:24:36] At such a good point. I completely agree with you. I mean, the leadership we're looking for now goes beyond rhetoric and statements and plans. It's much more to do with the integration of trade and industrial policy, domestic policy in order to move forward. And that's where we see the leadership. And let me just ask you for a second, because I think you've referenced the European Union a couple of times, and China obviously recently called on the EU to join it in resisting Trump's tariffs. And that situation is still ongoing. China in the EU have often been partners on these things, but also there have been tensions around the way China has run its economy and incentivized its green products, although those have obviously also been purchased in Europe in the context of this bizarre trade war that's being instigated by the US, what will that do to EU China relations, particularly on climate technology?

Li Shuo: [00:25:20] Let me just say it's impossible to overstate the importance of the European Union in this. I call the big three right, the US, the EU and China as the climate tricycle. You have three wheels, primarily to drive global climate action. Now we have one whale out which which is the US. The European Union has traditionally been. You know, if it is tricycle, the front whale with the US and China. Bean, bean, bean the two kind of whales behind. So the point here is in this three way relationship US, China, EU, the EU will probably need to make some of the most nuanced and delicate decisions with China in particular. I think we need to realize the issue that will define this new bilateral relationship in light of the US is on electric vehicles, right? And the larger point here is really if you look at the trade war and all the volatility is related to to Trump and Washington. It is in fact a climate war. Now, you know, the tariffs on the US China front is affecting the lithium ion battery in the US-China trade. The most that's the item in US-China bilateral trade that ranks the highest in terms of market volume. Now that electronics have been exempted by Trump, but by going back to EU-China. Ev is the thing to watch there. The European side has a number of very difficult interests to balance.

Li Shuo: [00:26:54] It wants to still maintain the speed of decarbonisation, but it also has a legacy auto industry that it needs to protect. At the same time, it is faced with fierce economic competition with China. The latest on that, which is, I think, very interesting and very much triggered by Trump's tariffs, is that Beijing and Brussels are now rolling up their sleeves and trying to get a pricing mechanism done for Chinese EV export to the European market. The idea here is basically, instead of the European side imposing tariffs to Chinese EV products, the two sides will agree that the Chinese products will be sold in the European market at a great price, and that price could potentially preserve and protect EU domestic industry. But at the same time ensure the EU does not lose speed in terms of deploying electric vehicles on its road. There's still a lot of variables and it is a highly dynamic negotiation process, so it's a bit hard to say at this point in time where that EV negotiation between the EU and China will go. But I think that's definitely something that we should pay very close attention and that won. That negotiation will also tell us a lot about both the EU and China intend to reposition themselves in light of the Trump presidency.

Tom: [00:28:23] That's so interesting.

Christiana : [00:28:24] Sorry, Tom, can I can I jump in? Because what you've just said, Li Shuo, she brings up a very important question for me that I would really love to hear your insight. It seems to me at the danger of making a either this or that scenario, and we know that life is never either or, but and also. But given where we are, China could continue to strengthen its position as the number one producer and exporter of EVs. All the technology that goes with it the batteries, the charging stations of solar panels, of wind turbines, et cetera, etc. but one scenario is that China really strengthens itself as the producer and exporter, not just to the EU, but to the rest of the world. Another scenario is that China does that and also invests into other countries. Let's call them the other members of the brick family for those countries to also begin to produce. And those are two very, very different strategies. The first is national focus of its competitive advantage. The second would arguably bring in the Belt and Road Initiative as tentacles through which China increases its presence through investment into a decarbonizing world. Can you compare those two? Are they actually making a choice between the two? Because of the stand of the United States? Or do you think that they might pursue both at the same time

Li Shuo: [00:30:14] Oh, Christine, a very good question. I think they will pursue both. But increasingly and as a result of the Trump tariffs, we will see China in addition to selling. Exporting is low carbon goods to other countries. Also invest in the manufacturing capacity to produce solar panels. Wind turbines. Electric vehicles. In other parts of the world. Your Indonesias. Mexico. Vietnam, Brazil, South Africa and so on. And this is very much about aligning the necessary industrial aspirations of all these other countries, right, with China's political and commercial agenda, in a way that I would argue would serve our long term climate interest. Because think about this. If Indonesia, through Chinese investment capital and with the help of technology and knowhow, also from China, can set up an EV factory in their own country, then the low carbon transportation agenda of Indonesia is its own agenda. It was a sudden will have stronger, I would argue political and economic buy in to accelerate its own climate agenda with the help from China. So as a result of the Trump Tower, that's increasingly a dynamic that we will see. So I think it's useful to think about China's role, at least at the commercial level, on three things. It is China's export of ready made low carbon products. It is China's investment FDI in helping other countries to produce those low carbon products themselves. And number three, it is also, to a large extent, China's investment directly in the energy infrastructure in those countries. So you will see the three things at the same time. And I think among these three things, the most important one politically, but also for our climate future, the most important one will be China's investment in other countries to help them produce those products themselves.

Christiana : [00:32:21] Exactly.

Tom: [00:32:22] I mean, that brings us to a world that looks very different, right? In terms of the decarbonisation pathway and the strategy that the Trump team has put in place, actually in some ways, then leads to far more. What you're saying far more direct investment and partnership with these different countries by China that accelerates the low carbon future, but it also accelerates the degree of influence that China has in many of these different countries.

Li Shuo: [00:32:47] The fundamental question here is can we decarbonize? Will we decouple between the US and China? I think the the economic trade decoupling is underway. I think it might get worse before it gets better. But really, for the rest of the world, there is an opportunity for us to decarbonize. We'll kind of recap a bit, if you will. So the question is can we foster that opportunity? And if so, that angle I think will be the key force that drive climate action in the next decade or so.

Tom: [00:33:22] So interesting. Christiana, do you want to ask any questions about. I mean, you know, now that you've interrupted us, please do hop in and anything you want to ask about politics.

Christiana : [00:33:30] So sorry about breaking protocol here.

Paul: [00:33:32] As I've tried to do in the chat. So that's one to look out for tomorrow. I will ask this question.

Christiana : [00:33:39] Go for it. Go for it. Go for it, Paul.

Paul: [00:33:41] You have written that China will increasingly want to engage not only on the commercial level, providing hardware investment and construction, but also engage with the policy frameworks of those recipient countries. That's going to take some time, you said, but I think it's increasingly where China needs to go. And I would love because I think, you know, policy and regulatory solutions are such an important part of the decarbonisation journey. How can China best encourage policy development around the world, do you think?

Li Shuo: [00:34:07] Yeah. No, that's another very good question. So again, if we imagine ourselves in this new world, right, where China would in general have much more integration with, with the rest of the world, right. And help them to decarbonize and to manufacture low carbon products. Then at the political level, and this is where your question is, is after. Do we also see China playing some sort of a role to convince those countries to embrace stronger climate action or to improve their domestic regulatory framework, to enable the deployment of those low carbon products for goods? I think we're still at a very early stage in all of this. The commercial level realignment hasn't fully played out and happened. I think you know what China will do at a political level in terms of, you know, convincing other countries to change their policies. It is also related to really the political or diplomatic tradition of China. What kind of China do we see? Do we foresee over the next decade or so? Do we see a more proactive global player that is not only interested in being the merchant of the low carbon economy. Right. But also in in many ways the the rule maker. Right. That's really essentially the question. I don't have the answer to that question. One question that we need to increasingly ask ourselves is, is it worth our while to actually accelerate that process, and if so, how do we do that? How do we help both other developing countries, but also China, to speed up that process? Again, if our understanding, our belief is this is the thing that will drive action going forward.

Tom: [00:35:53] Thank you. I mean, I think the interesting there, if we do see China as the lead economic actor in this transition, both domestically and internationally through exports and through partnerships, as well as a more proactive global player and a rule maker. In partnership with creating the policies, we begin to glimpse the emergence of a world that could significantly be on a path to decarbonization. I don't think it's the world Donald Trump planned to create, but I think there are parts of that that could be quite interesting for our agenda. Christiana, did you want to come in with another question?

Christiana : [00:36:27] Yeah, I wanted to just push back a little bit on that last idea, because you obviously know a thousand times better than I, but my sense from afar is that China, at least traditionally, has always shied away or protected itself from anything that could be interpreted as political or regulatory interference in any other country. And I believe that they have done that because they don't want the same treatment of themselves. That's my suspicion. But, you know, up to you to confirm or dis confirm. So I wonder if their leadership here, as you have pointed out, with both their own manufacturing capacity and export capacity, plus their investment is not going to be how they lead the decarbonisation without getting into policy changes or regulatory changes of other countries, but rather using what I would say is a much more powerful scalpel of change, which is the economic argument. Somehow I feel that they will shy away from anything that could be considered political interference. Or do you think that given where we are, that they might revise their traditional behaviour?

Li Shuo: [00:37:58] Well, I agree with you, Christiana. I think the inertia in the Chinese mentality to now engage or intervene with the domestic policies of other countries, I think will be there and will be there for a long time. But if we are talking about this in a more forward looking, putting this in a time frame of the next ten or even 20 years. I think on that time frame, China will increasingly be confronted by the question of, you know, yes, they will rely on the commercial economic logic and that will be still be be the most powerful one. But do they also need to be more proactive when it comes to shaping global rules and the domestic policy framework of other countries? And increasingly, there are huge commercial interests in this will direct their political diplomatic approach toward the more proactive direction. Question then, to practitioners in global climate politics is is that a good or bad thing? Right? How can we capture the climate benefits out of it? So I do think that's, you know, an area that we need to pay attention to. It is part of the much broader transition of China as it gains economic global economic power. It will also need to find a new type of diplomacy. When it comes to climate change, and in many ways, I would even argue in the process of reaching the Paris Agreement. Increasingly, you're in the thick of this. Many times we found it to be problematic that China, despite of its huge influence and its big global carbon footprint, was the shy player there. What I'm advocating for here is a more progressive, a more forward looking and increasingly, a more economically aligned approach of China in climate diplomacy. I think if that that is achievable, that's something that we can count over the next ten or even 20 years to drive climate action.

Tom: [00:40:05] Fascinating. I would just like to ask you to go back a little earlier in the conversation. We talked about us abdication of leadership, the moment for the rest of the world, the role that China has in stepping up. Along with the European Union and other countries. What should we be looking out for in terms of signals from China over the next few months? That will give us a glimpse as to the decision making in response to this moment. The NDC is, of course a big one, but what else can we expect to see that we'll be able to point to? That will tell us the choices that China has made in response to US abdication of leadership.

Li Shuo: [00:40:40] Sure, Tom. The first point to make here is, again, going back to the point that I made earlier as climate people, I am hearing, you know, a lot of concerns that because of the uncertainties and turbulence in the world, the climate agenda might slip off the radar, might not be as important in global affairs as, you know, the last couple of years. I want to make a point for us to realize the other side of the coin. Again, if you look at the US-China trade war, the most effective trade item now is in low carbon development lithium ion battery. If you look at how other countries are reacting to the Trump tariffs by realigning themselves, look at EU and China, the most important bilateral relationship, the most important thing that they are talking about now is also low carbon related, right. How to deal with Chinese EV export and investment in the European market. So the point I want to make here is instead of climate taking a backseat in global affairs, climate is at the very forefront. It is almost in your face now. This is the thing that's been decided and discussed in big power relationship. So in a way, this this just reflects how mainstreamed and elevated this issue has been. And of course, with it There are complexities that we also need to deal with. How do we manage? You know, a just and fair trade relationship.

Li Shuo: [00:42:20] As a result, the importance of how climate change this issue has or has become. But going back to your question, Tom, I think again, the EU-China relationship will be very important to watch how they want to handle the electric vehicle sector. Definitely worth keeping an eye on. We are expecting a EU China summit taking place in July. This will take place at really the leaders level. What do they plan to say on the climate and decarbonisation agenda? Brics summit is also happening in July in Brazil. This is really some of the most important countries in the global South. What position do they want to take? How will the momentum generated there feed into Cop 30? That's also a very, very important watch point. And then in this busy realignment, pauses between China and the rest of the world. How will they handle the export versus investment part of their relationship, which which Christiana asked about? Right. That's also a very, very important issue to watch. And finally, I would pay attention to the high level signals that the Chinese leaders will send from Beijing. I'm sure there will be new rhetorics. There will be new signals. There will be a stronger willingness for China to engage with other countries in the world, and also multilateral processes. You know how substantive those rhetorics will become. I think we will also need to pay close attention to, you know, to that.

Tom: [00:44:03] Lisa, thank you so much for joining us. This has been incredibly helpful and insightful. Really appreciate your time and your reflections, and we very much hope to get you back at some point in the future to keep talking about this issue. Thanks for joining us.

Li Shuo: [00:44:14] Thanks for having me.

Tom: [00:44:19] I've got to say, that was really fascinating to do that deep dive into China. I think we need to do these analyses on different countries more regularly because you just learn so much. One thing I'm leaving it with is I shouldn't trust you to to stay quiet when I'm supposed to be interviewing someone. But other than that, Christiana.

Paul: [00:44:32] Started the conversation. I only came in after her. Christianity made it all right. Yeah.

Christiana : [00:44:36] I started.

Paul: [00:44:37] That.

Tom: [00:44:38] And he famously follows protocol. But in this instance, somehow that.

Christiana : [00:44:41] I never follow protocol.

Tom: [00:44:43] I know that's what I'm teasing you.

Christiana : [00:44:45] Well, I thoroughly enjoyed that conversation. I come away with two thoughts. One is a humorous thought of how Trump's temper tantrum that we have been seeing for the past few months could arguably lead the world exactly into the opposite direction that he wanted and could perhaps, you know, Accelerate global decarbonization. Global minus the US. And what that means for the US. If they're going to be basically stuck with, I don't know, lighting their streets with candles when everyone else has moved over to a light bulb, so to speak. It remains to be seen, but very interesting how they have just chosen to exit and not take advantage of the new technologies, and how that is actually accelerating the rest. So that's just my my humorous comment. The other piece, just to underline what we heard from him, is that the recent news that China has stopped their export of heavy, rare earth metals and rare earth magnets, both of which are absolutely crucial for electric vehicles.

Tom: [00:46:04] Of which they control almost the entire global supply.

Christiana : [00:46:07] Well, this is the point. China produces 99% of the world's supply of heavy, rare earth metals, 99% and 90% of the world's rare earth magnets. And they have stopped that, especially to the United States. They're no longer exporting. So that really fits in very nicely with what we heard from the show, that they're getting ready for a completely new strategy.

Paul: [00:46:34] Yeah. And just on the theme of doing country deep dives, we did a country deep dive about Costa Rica. And I can't help mentioning that in population terms, China has 274 times the population of Costa Rica. So imagine us doing 274 deep dives on Costa Rica.

Tom: [00:46:51] Thank God we did Costa Rica first.

Christiana : [00:46:54] Okay, Paul. Paul. Now. So that actually has precipitated a story in 1997 when we were all in Kyoto and we just did our two episodes about the Kyoto Protocol. Costa Rica and China were completely at odds about the carbon market. Costa Rica arguing for the carbon market. China arguing against the carbon market. Ironically, they ended up being the major benefactor from the carbon market. But in 1997, they were very, very much against and. Professor Zhong, who was the lead negotiator and who we saw personified in the Kyoto play.

Tom: [00:47:32] Very well depicted in the.

Christiana : [00:47:33] Play, came up to me while I was having lunch. Tapped me on the shoulder and said, Christiana, can I have a word? And I said, yes, of course. Professor Zhong and I looked up because he was a very tall person. I'm small anyway, but I was sitting. I looked up and he had in his hand. In his right hand he had a tiny pencil that was less than an inch long, and in his left hand he had a tiny little piece of paper that fit very amply into the center of his palm. And with these two tiny little bits props, I would say, with these two tiny little props. He says, Christiana, could you just remind me? What is the total population of Costa Rica? And this, of course, in the middle of this discussion about the carbon market between basically Costa Rica and China. So he was making a very good point, a very, very good point that Costa Rica is tiny and China is huge. And the fact now, just to fast forward the fact that we now have the number one emitter in the world making its mind up, that they're not going to approach this climate aspiration through climate diplomacy anymore because their partners have gone completely crazy that they're actually going to continue to do it through climate economics and not climate policy is huge in the change of strategy, but it is huge because they are so huge. Both.

Tom: [00:49:10] Yeah, I think that's the key point, Christiana, is that the shift in approach is going from. I don't know if we could have called it a previous sort of like US based leadership to now a Chinese based leadership where we've gone from big shared commitments to economic and trade policy, demonstrating redeployment of capital and investment in a different future that we then build. And I thought your question to him was excellent around the type of relationship they want to have with the rest of the world, the road, as he called it. Is that going to be we now just see customers in other places, or is it going to be we're going to partner to help build up the industrial manufacturing base, to create the technologies of the future all around the world in partnership with ourselves. That model where you shift the underlying approach to one of industrial and trade policy, you partner in a different way to build up manufacturing base. You base it on clean technology to build out the industries of the future. I mean, once it's set out like that by him, you can see how that unfolds and it unfolds at pace. And there are problems with any model of the future. But there's a lot to like about that world, a lot. That is really how it comes together.

Christiana : [00:50:23] So, Tom, does that mean that I'm forgiven for interrupting you?

Tom: [00:50:28] You're always forgiven. Absolutely.

Paul: [00:50:30] Before you do the terrible protocol breach, you're you're forgiven because you're a Dame commander of the British Empire. Whatever you.

Tom: [00:50:36] Like. Yeah. Dame commanders aren't controlled by protocol. Yeah.

Paul: [00:50:39] But I wanted to, uh, pick up on his answer to you because I was listening very, very carefully. And he said that actually, the biggest pain, you know, for the US now is carbon related. And he said climate is now at the forefront of global affairs. Yeah. And this reflects how important and elevated this issue is. That is, in a funny kind of way, a cause for celebration. And he said the EU China dynamic is important to watch and I bet it is. But then the other thing he said, you know, you suggested that China and Christiana had stayed out of politics to some extent, and he even spoke about it. He said China was a bit shy, but he then said, and I made particular attention. I was typing down almost verbatim what he said, but over time, looking more over the next 10 to 20 years, China will be confronted by a kind of commercial and economic logic and may be more proactive in shaping global rules and with huge commercial objectives and looking to capture climate benefits. He talked about a new type of diplomacy when it comes to climate change, and I think that's incredibly exciting and something that we should all look forward to. And you know, here the starting gun of the sort of 21st century industrial race being fired. You know, in this podcast.

Tom: [00:51:52] I've learned an enormous amount in this episode. And actually, I have to say, I leave it feeling pretty optimistic about the role that China might play on the world stage. And we've thought a lot about that in the past episodes of Is China going to step up and fill the US leadership vacuum? And I would say where I am at the end of that, maybe we should all say actually, but I feel like they're not going to fill it in the way the US did. They're going to fill it in their own way. It's going to be different, but it might actually be pretty effective for what's needed right now.

Paul: [00:52:16] Yeah, I mean, Warren Buffett said that tariffs are kind of an act of war in a strange, giggly voice. I think that the, you know, the let's not call it a war, the competition for leadership and decarbonization. You know, really, we're now looking at the incredible economic power of China. And will it form a great partnership with the EU, two of the three big wheels of the world economy? I hope and believe so.

Christiana : [00:52:37] You know, several episodes ago, I can't remember exactly remember which one, but several episodes ago we talked about the possibility that the BRICs, for sure, led by China, would reinterpret global decarbonization to their benefit in their own way for the moment of development that they are in. And we said if they do so, we actually may be in very good hands from a climate action perspective, and this conversation leads me to at least have a sense not no guarantee, of course, but maybe maybe that's what we're seeing. We're seeing a reinterpretation of decarbonization moving away, as we said from the beginning. Away from ideology, away from climate policy, away from protocol and international multilateral negotiations over to hard nosed economics. What is going to help our economy? Where are we competitive? And let's go for that.

Tom: [00:53:35] All right. Thank you, everybody, for joining us this week. Always a pleasure and a privilege to have you with us in outrage and optimism. We've got some great episodes coming up in the next couple of weeks, some old friends and some great voices talking about some really remarkable shifts that we're seeing at the moment in the world. So please do subscribe. Please stay with us and we will be back next week. Thanks for being.

Paul: [00:53:55] Here.