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290: Delay, Deny, Derail: inside the fossil fuel lobby’s playbook at COPs

How have fossil fuel lobbyists become so embedded in the COP system, and how can we disrupt their involvement in domestic and international politics? This is our second episode inspired by the RSC and Good Chance Theatre’s production of Kyoto.

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About this episode

What role have fossil fuel lobbyists really played in climate negotiations over the past three decades? And what impact do they continue to have on climate progress today?

In this episode, Christiana Figueres, Tom Rivett-Carnac and Paul Dickinson explore the history of this often unseen influence, ask why fossil fuel lobbyists have become so embedded in the COP system, and consider what levers are emerging to disrupt their involvement in domestic and international politics.

This episode also features another panel from our live event at The Conduit, inspired by the RSC and Good Chance Theatre’s Olivier-nominated production of Kyoto, and hosted by the Financial Times’ Pilita Clark. She’s joined by climate lawyer Tessa Khan, climate finance and energy expert Kirsty Hamilton, and historian of climate change negotiations and former UNFCCC secretariat Joanna Depledge, to unpack how industry lobbyists - from oil majors to car manufacturers - used misinformation, procedural manipulation, and political influence to undermine progress in Kyoto and beyond.

So, how have fossil fuel lobby tactics changed in the years since Kyoto? Have they achieved everything they set out to? And what might the world look like if the industry had never sought to delay and derail climate negotiations - or, better yet, had taken responsibility for its role in the green transition?

This is our second episode inspired by the RSC and Good Chance Theatre’s production of Kyoto. You can listen to the first episode, Behind the Scenes at Kyoto: Drama and diplomacy on the world stage here. 



Learn more 

📚Read: This Guardian article about the Greenpeace loss in North Dakota


📺Watch: Climate of Concern, a 1991 film by Shell



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Producer: Ben Weaver-Hincks

Video Producer: Caitlin Hanrahan

Exec Producer: Ellie Clifford and Dino Sofos

Commissioning Editor: Sarah Thomas 


This is a Persephonica production for Global Optimism and is part of the Acast Creator Network.

Full Transcript

Tom : [00:00:02] Hello and welcome to Outrage and Optimism. I'm Tom Rivett-Carnac.

Christiana Figueres: [00:00:05] I'm Christiana Figueres.

Paul Dickinson: [00:00:07] And I'm Paul Dickinson.

Tom : [00:00:08] This week we bring you the second part of our conversation about the play Kyoto, focusing specifically on the influence of fossil fuel companies on the climate negotiations. Thanks for being here. So, friends, we're back again with the second part of our discussion about the play, Kyoto, that we are still reveling from. Having enjoyed that, I suppose, ten days ago now. But I think I'd like to start by just saying. Paul, finally, the podcast has come round to the topic that you spend every week talking about anyway. So how do you feel this must be a big moment for you?

Paul Dickinson: [00:00:41] You know, a stopped clock is right twice a year and I'm having that little moment. You know it's going to be the right time of day for me and and watch me like a comet passed through and then carry on the same theme. And we're going to be talking about other things. Not at all

Christiana Figueres: [00:00:52] . Wait, what does that mean? What is Paul's pet topic?

Tom : [00:00:56] I mean, maybe it's just me that thinks this, but my sense is that every week, Paul, Not wrongly. I'm not criticizing him for this actually brings it back to the fact that one of our major barriers is the fact that corporations are not pushing governments to do the right thing. They're pushing them to do the wrong thing. And whatever the question is, Paul rightly points out that that's one of the answers. But today we're talking about that directly.

Paul Dickinson: [00:01:16] And the Royal Shakespeare Company has come forward not just to agree with me, but to set it out and to be nominated for an Olivier Award for this brilliant.

Christiana Figueres: [00:01:25] No two Olivier awards

Paul Dickinson: [00:01:25] Award.

Tom : [00:01:26] Two.

Christiana Figueres: [00:01:27] The play itself is nominated for an Olivier Award, and George Bush, as the actor who is playing. Raoul Estrada, is also nominated. And we will know this Sunday it will be announced at the Royal Albert Hall in London. Very exciting.

Tom : [00:01:43] Very, very exciting and well, well deserved. I mean, I'm sure everything that's entered is brilliant, but we will bring you I mean, news will be everywhere anyway, but we will be celebrating them next week, I'm sure, and hopefully they will win. Okay, so this week we're going to talk about fossil fuel lobbying and in particular this remarkable story in the play of Don Perlman. But let's just start off. It seems to me now that whenever we go to a cop, one of the major news stories is always how many fossil fuel lobbyists are there and whether or not they've hijacked the process. And there's a few statistics that always come out every year about the number of lobbyists. But just before we get into all of that, Christiana, what's your you mean you ran the UN climate convention for years? Was your experience that you were constantly being harangued by fossil fuel lobbyists? Who did you see their evidence everywhere when you were in office?

Christiana : [00:02:29] Well, I was not being harangued, but yes, the negotiations were um, but but but let's remember, it is a coming together of all possible interests, right? And what they have, which is different to everyone else, is that their interest is diametrically opposed to the interest of the advance of the climate convention and climate negotiations. So that is what makes them very unique among many, many, many stakeholders who are there lobbying and pushing for their particular interests.

Paul Dickinson: [00:03:08] And just to say, Kirsty Hamilton pointed out, it was the oil and gas industry, but it was also the car manufacturers, the airplane manufacturers. You know, whoever wanted to avoid disruptions thought themselves thinking, oh, well, you know, this could be risky for us. Let's just try and and stop this from happening because it could upset our existing business plans, which is an incredibly childish way of viewing a major global problem with the atmosphere.

Tom : [00:03:29] Absolutely. And I think it probably is fair to say that it was very crude and it's become very sophisticated, but it's still present. It's probably a fair assessment of what's happened.

Paul Dickinson: [00:03:37] Oh, no, I think it's just moving into suddenly becoming very, very unsophisticated. And we can talk about that.

Tom : [00:03:43] Oh, interesting. All right. We'll get to.

Christiana : [00:03:45] That. Well, and in the unsophisticated bucket. Thank you for putting it that way, Paul. I would say the last few cops that have taken place in basically Petro states, the presence and the impact and the lobbying of the fossil fuel industry has been, as Paul calls it, unsophisticated. It has been very blunt. It has been very blunt to the point of offering directly, offering to various court presidents to do fossil fuel deals, using the Cop as a staging ground for those fossil fuel deals. I mean, you cannot be more blunt than that.

Tom : [00:04:26] Yeah. I mean, or in some cases, if you remember the cop that was in Dubai, there was a big exposé that the Cop presidency were actually using Cop preparatory meetings to arrange gas deals. So this stuff can even be as formal as the process itself to just put a few numbers behind this. I mean, Cop 28, that was the one in Dubai. 2456 fossil fuel lobbyists represented 3% of the total attendees. And then Cop 29 a bit smaller 1773. This made fossil fuel lobbyists the fourth largest delegation. And coal, oil and gas lobbyists were more than the entire delegations of the top ten most climate vulnerable countries combined. Now, I do have a couple of questions in there about how you define a fossil fuel lobbyist. Sometimes it's very obvious and sometimes it's a little more subtle, but nevertheless, clearly the numbers are huge. So maybe we should just turn to the play. I mean, the central character we talked about this last time, the anti-hero is Don Perlman, a real life character who you knew Christiana and Richard Kinley knew, and many others. What were the reflections that both of you had on how the fossil fuel industry was depicted in the play?

Paul Dickinson: [00:05:30] I think you're, you know, the issue that we're going to come onto here ultimately is what do you think is the character of that industry? You know, I'm going to let the cat out of the bag here. I think the reason it's become very unsophisticated is because over the quarter of a century, I've been working in climate change. I think in democracies, the case for taking action on climate change has been one. And if you look, for example, the Trump regime, they're not they're not talking about climate change at all. They never mentioned it once. They know they actually can't win an argument about this major issue in a democracy, and they're trying to end democracy. That's the plan for the fossil fuel authoritarianism, the very simple plan that's going on in North America right now. So, you know, my my sense is that increasing a lot of sophistication, a lot of clever lobbying, which that play brilliantly describes. But it's got to a point now where they've completely given up trying to win any kind of argument, and they're trying to snuff out public debate in the United States. And that scares the bejesus out of me.

Christiana : [00:06:28] Yeah. When I look back, I think I see sort of an evolution of the tactics that they have been using. What we saw in the play, which is pretty accurate, is the manipulation of the process of negotiating, just manipulating so that you stay only in the process and it becomes quagmire itself, the process, so that you know in advance on content or on agreements at all, and that they're just really, really experts at doing that. They also typically have used all kinds of arguments to deny science, or at least to seed the doubt of science on climate change, despite the fact that they probably knew the science of climate change way before any of us as as has been depicted in in the play. But they have been so effective at delaying policy, whether that policy is the international negotiations themselves or national policy either way. But that is what they have done for many years. And what we are seeing now is what I would call a deflection to the so-called virtues of fossil fuel, where they're now arguing that it is only and I can just see them putting their hands on their heart. It is only the fossil fuel industry that can possibly alleviate poverty and bring electricity to all those millions of people around the world who have no electricity. I mean, honestly, if they could do that, they would have done it decades ago. And the fact, frankly, that they have now turned the continent of Africa into the battleground of fossil fuels, because my sense is they have lost Asia because clean technologies are advancing there very fast. They have certainly lost Europe. They are losing the Americas. And they really want to hang on to Africa, because that is where their sobbing story of alleviation of poverty can fit best. And that is where they are going around to all governments to bring this sobbing story. So irresponsible, so irresponsible because we know that they are not the answer to poverty. In fact, quite the opposite.

Tom : [00:09:02] Thank you for raising it, Christiana. And we will turn to the clips in a minute, because we want to share with you listeners some of the amazing conversations these great panelists we had. But just just to answer that, ask that question. They are not the answer. Do they know that? I mean, just to to poke on that a little bit. One of the very sophisticated things in this play is that Don Pearlman is presented as someone who does have a conscience and who does think he's doing the right thing, but history then moves against him. He's protecting American freedom and way of life, which is why, actually, it would be a less satisfying play if he was just a villain. So do you think that actually those who are still playing the game that Don Pearlman played then, are now doing so with real mal intent? I'm sure it's a mixture, but what's your impression of that?

Christiana : [00:09:50] Well, if it is a mixture, then the. How much? How many go? How many eggs go into each basket? I would say more and more eggs go into the basket of. They fully well know what they're doing. And then there are a few little eggs in the basket of oh yes, yes, yes, we are going to bring people out of poverty. But, but but, Tom, I mean honestly, can you, can you seriously still believe that?

Tom : [00:10:18] No, I can't, but I wanted to ask you the question.

Christiana : [00:10:21] Then the question is, so why haven't you done it? Yeah. The fossil fuel industry has had absolute monopoly over the entire energy and electricity matrix of the world for what, 50, 60, 70 years? So why haven't they done it? Because they can't. Because technically, the infrastructure that is necessary for fossil fuels cannot reach into the depths of where poverty is, which is very often far away from any extension of the grid. To begin with.

Paul Dickinson: [00:10:53] It doesn't want to. I'm going to answer your question, Tom, and we'll put in the show notes. This film from 1991. So that's six years before Kyoto. It's called a climate of Concern. It's made by the Shell Film unit. So an oil companies film unit is a very professional documentary, and it warns of terrible climate change if we don't take action. It shows refugees suffering floods, terrible storms, droughts. I mean, it's not a case of just they knew. They actually put out publicity materials to warn the world. What happened is that different people with different priorities in these large organizations took over and, you know, undertook what may well be seen as the greatest crime in human history or one of the greatest crimes in human history. And that's terrifying, I think, for these executives themselves. I cannot believe they're doing it now, actually trying to limit democracy in the United States. Can you believe it?

Tom : [00:11:48] We should move on. Otherwise we're in danger of this becoming a three part series. So Don Perlman, just very quickly, for those who may have seen the play, I'm sure people know he's a real life character. So he was around very much. Christiana, as I said earlier, knew him, Richard knew him. He was a Reagan era Interior Department official who worked at the law firm Patton. Boggs attended every Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change meeting until his death in 2005. He was dubbed the high priest of the Carbon Club, which prompted Greenpeace International to dress young volunteers as monks and train them around from meeting to meetings, so people kind of knew what he was doing.

Paul Dickinson: [00:12:20] Bless Greenpeace.

Tom : [00:12:20] But very much a real life character inside the climate negotiations. Anything you want to say specifically about Don Perlman? Christiana was the only one who knew him.

Christiana : [00:12:28] I mean, I was a very, very, very young. No, I wasn't very young. I wasn't a young negotiator just cutting my teeth into negotiations in 1997. But I do remember every time that he walked by or that he took the floor, it sort of sent chills down my body. And I was glad at the conversation that we had after the play at the Kenwood to confirm with those who perhaps even had conversations with him that he was a spooky individual. He was really spooky.

Paul Dickinson: [00:13:02] Everyone said the same thing.

Tom : [00:13:04] Well, I mean, that's sort of that's almost satisfying in the narrative of the story of who he was. It would have been a bit disarming if he'd been very cuddly and charming. Right. Okay, so let's go into our panel. So this discussion was moderated by a good friend, Pilita Clarke, columnist at the Financial Times. And The Conversation examined how fossil fuel lobbying operated at that time and considered its influence on the outcome in the international climate negotiations. Now, there were three incredible panelists joining her. First, Kirsty Hamilton, climate finance and energy policy expert. Secondly, Joanna Depledge. She is a climate policy expert and former UNF IPCC Secretariat member. She's actually portrayed in the play, and we should also mention she is probably the world's foremost historian on the climate negotiations. She knows more about what has happened in the last 30 or 40 years than anyone else alive. And Tessa Khan again, former guest on this podcast, climate lawyer and founder of uplift UK. Both Kirsty and Joanna were at Kyoto.

Paul Dickinson: [00:14:01] There's even a little photo of them on the front page of the Japanese newspaper that was out at the time.

Tom : [00:14:06] So let's kick off by hearing about how these lobbyists functions at the earliest. Cops.

Pilita Clarke: [00:14:11] Back in 1987. What did the fossil fuel lobby look like at cops?

Kirsty Hamilton: [00:14:16] Yeah. I mean, I think what I would say is that Perlman was the kind of masterclass in how you use the pulleys and levers available in the text and the negotiating process to introduce as many delays and complexities. And, you know, frankly, obstructions, you know, impact of climate change would be married to impact of response measures. But meanwhile, back at home, the fossil fuel lobby itself had the biggest impact nationally in seeking to influence the negotiating mandate and the context of countries, and particularly for what we might call big cops, especially Kyoto, where you are dealing with legally binding obligations that would have then been a core market driver. They definitely ran a big campaign. This was industrialized country, so Europe and the US, but in the US, in fact, maybe Ono can stick all the adverts. I mean, they were full page adverts with a strategy targeting the US Senate to secure the Senate to pre-agreed to block any outcome from Kyoto. If I had certain characteristics which were at that point deal breakers and they succeeded in doing that. And so that was one example. And then when they got to the negotiations, they would be dealing with, you know, the matters at hand, which which we talked some of which about before. But, I mean, I did a count up of the delegates, you know, a bit like a very early version of of influence. There was 10 to 1. I did, I just had to recount them this morning. 10 to 1. Fossil fuel and nuclear to the progressive, the nascent. There was a nascent progressive business lobby in Kyoto, and there were insurers that were there. But that was a it was a different world back then.

Joanna Depledge: [00:16:07] Yeah, because we had the, um, the grey business lobby and we had the green business lobby and obviously the gray were the anti climate change and the green were the emerging green lobby. But I do want to say it wasn't just fossil fuels. It was also the automobile manufacturers. It was the Boeing. It was the aviation manufacturers. It was the miners. It was the trade unions. It was the US Chamber of Commerce. And just to have a shout out for the Global Climate Coalition, the GTC, and this was a huge American body of industrialists, which was basically set up also to wreck the Kyoto Protocol, but with a much greater influence domestically in the US. And just one more point I want to make, which I think comes out really, really well in the play, that it wasn't just about the economics of fossil fuels. It was also about ideology and is about this rejection in large swathes of the US, the Republican Party of internationalism, of multilateralism, this fear of losing sovereignty by having rules imposed from above.

Tom : [00:17:09] So interesting to hear these reflections on all the different levels at which these lobbyists operate and the different types of businesses and the way they engage, what are you both take from that?

Paul Dickinson: [00:17:19] For me, the big lesson is that commercial interests can overpower governments, and I think this is actually a key feature for when we as a as a species, are redesigning the United Nations. I think we need to make it more robust in terms of responding to very large collections of interests. You know, our challenge in this moment is fossil fuel and associated industries, you know, threatening democracy and climate change. It may be digital tomorrow, it might be pharmaceuticals the decade after that. But we need to make sure that the intergovernmental system is able to protect us from commercial interests when they focus and fight us.

Tom : [00:17:54] Absolutely. Christiana. Any thoughts?

Christiana : [00:17:56] Oh, well, I'm I'm just honestly, I continue to be aghast at the concentration of responsibility because in negotiations we think about historical responsibility and future and differentiated responsibility, but we don't think about concentration of responsibility. The fact that there are ten companies in the world. Ten. One. Zero. As many fingers as we have on our hands that are responsible for a whopping 40% of greenhouse gas emissions, I mean, it is just it's mind boggling. It is mind boggling. And the fact that those ten companies are arguably always at the cop. And I've said, yeah.

Paul Dickinson: [00:18:40] If they were here. They'd say, well, we just sell them. We just sell this stuff. It's other people who burn it. Exactly. You know, you hold the cigarette manufacturers, you know, liable for children becoming addicted to cigarettes.

Tom : [00:18:50] I just have to put as a segue here. You know, my dad's in oil and gas, and I grew up. And every time one of you says, oh, but we're going to electrify Africa or, oh, we only sell this stuff. I feel like I'm sort of eight years old again. And I'm listening to my dad explain why no change will ever happen in the world. So I have a slight regression there.

Christiana : [00:19:05] Well, Tom, I'm glad that you're not eight years old anymore. And congratulations for the journey that you have made.

Paul Dickinson: [00:19:13] When Cristiana and I were making daisy chains and you were finding oil. Tom, I think you'll find that the oil that you found didn't stay where it was. I think you'll find it went on big ships to where we are.

Tom : [00:19:21] I don't think we ever found any. Which is a relief. Now, looking back. I mean, just one thing here, and I don't know if we'll include this or not, but, Christiana, I remember when you and I first met a few years before Paris, and we talked about the work that was needed to do. And one of the things you said to me was, there's so many people on the other side of this argument, we need to pile in and play a similar game. And the groundswell program that you directed and I put together under your instruction ahead of Paris was very much a kind of mirror image to this Dawn Parlement approach. Right. So how do we reach out to thousands of individuals that it can exert? Leverage on the negotiations. And we did it secretly. So clearly you felt you needed that left hand strategy to counter the sort of dark arts that were being practiced against you.

Christiana : [00:20:02] Are you used the word I was waiting? When are you going to say the dark arts? I was just waiting for that one.

Paul Dickinson: [00:20:09] Yeah, but let me just build on this. You know, I think we've all worked in this for a long time. And, you know, actually, thousands of investors and, you know, tens of thousands of gigantic companies have all read the graphs, looked at the charts, thought about it, discussed climate change at a board level, and most of them have come to the right answer. And that's why we've been so successful. And that's why I'm going to go back to it. The Trump administration isn't talking about climate change. They've lost that argument. They're just trying to shut down public debate.

Tom : [00:20:35] Mhm. Okay. So given that we have spoken in detail about the ways in which fossil fuel lobbyists have made cops so much more difficult. There's an interesting question to be asked about why fossil fuel lobbyists are even at a cop. And that's that's something that the panel also took up, wondering what would a world look like where these lobbyists weren't anywhere near the negotiating table? Let's have a listen.

Pilita Clarke: [00:20:57] Would it make any difference, do you think, if no cop ever had anyone who could be described as a fossil fuel lobbyist present again?

Joanna Depledge: [00:21:06] I just don't see how you could do that. And, I mean, there are so many countries that have links with fossil fuels anyway. I mean, you know, could the UK go because it exploits gas? What about Norway? I mean, I think that would be that would be very, very difficult. And I also think that the influence of fossil fuel lobbyists is greater now domestically, much greater there than internationally. I mean, maybe they do kind of still pass notes to Saudi Arabia, but I just don't think that's their modus operandi now.

Pilita Clarke: [00:21:33] I mean, I think as soon as you put the word energy transition next to your primary business model, you're going to it's going to be very difficult for anybody to navigate, excluding them. I mean, if you could, then if your primary motivation is not absolutely aligned with the task at hand, you shouldn't really be there. But actually the mechanics of of delivering that I think would be, but it'd be very interesting if others have. I've got I'm sure people have thought deeply about it.

Joanna Depledge: [00:22:03] Can I just say a small anecdote here? There was a time early on in the 1990s, when there was a proposal that all NGOs would have to sign up to the objectives of the convention. They just have to sign something, and this would be a condition of them being accredited. Just yes, we support the aims of the convention and I have on record, which maybe I shouldn't. Effects from Don Perlman to the executive secretary, then basically accusing the Secretariat of being a thought police and exercising thought control because of that.

Pilita Clarke: [00:22:33] So yeah, I mean, I am reminded of Cop26, where there were no speakers on any official events allowed that hadn't signed up to Paris and 1.5 degrees. So I think there's layers of way you could sort of ratchet the difficulty of of access, especially to people who are in the midst of decision making.

Tom : [00:22:56] Reflecting on that panel, I mean, the practicality question is one that we can't avoid, but is there a case for having fossil fuel representation at the Cop? They, of course, still supply the majority of global energy, one of the largest industries. Should we be thinking more strategically about ways to mitigate their influence?

Christiana : [00:23:13] Well, honestly, so difficult to do because, as Joanna points out, the fact is that those seven sisters that appear as the seven big oil companies in 1997, they have merged among themselves. And today they're known as big oil. And it's ExxonMobil, Chevron, shell, BP, perhaps Eni and TotalEnergies. And so you could say, well, they shouldn't be allowed in. Oh, okay. But here is the real difficulty. The difficulty is that actually, most of the oil and gas that is on the market is not even being produced by them. It's being produced by state owned oil and gas companies that come from, for example, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, China, India with its coal. Norway, Mexico, Venezuela. Even a Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, etc., etc., etc.. So you then say, how do we deal with this? The United Nations negotiations are always among the national governments of the parties that have ratified, in this case, the convention. Could we even possibly begin to conceive of a negotiation that would not include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, China, India, Norway, Mexico? I mean, it's impossible. It's impossible. So that is the difficulty. The difficulty is that it is not just companies themselves. The tentacles of the oil and gas industry are very pervasive, and they reach deep down into governments, and there's no way that we're going to exclude governments from being at the table where they ought to be. Load More

Tom : [00:25:06] Yeah. So the intersection there is so complete that actually there's no way to do it is what you're saying. And that's what we had on the panel. Paul, you got to vote.

Paul Dickinson: [00:25:14] Just an awareness. I think you describe it perfectly, Christiana. But we can increase awareness that, you know, sometimes you'll meet people who will be expressing opinions that sort of seem to be the nation's opinions. Perhaps they are, but they're also expressing business opinions. And the counter voice to all of this is just for everyone to be super aware of, of the dangers, the risks and the science.

Tom : [00:25:33] Yeah. And of course so, so totally understand. And I think the panel agreed with you and completely with you that Christiana, in terms of the challenge and difficulty of this, but it has been considerable, right? I mean, the degree of drag this is created on our collective efforts. So that actually happened on the evening as well. The panel looked back and considered the victories of the lobby over the last decade. Let's listen.

Pilita Clarke: [00:25:54] What actual influence do you think the lobbyists have been able to have from the fossil fuel industry over the years? What have been the really big victories?

Joanna Depledge: [00:26:02] Maybe I'll start with the kind of earlier history kind of covered by the play. I think they've had several victories. And here again, I'm not talking just about the fossil fuels, but about the entire ecosystem. As you put it, a predominantly US force is overwhelmingly US, not exclusive, but overwhelmingly, I think the first victory was ensuring that there was no voting rule in the negotiations. And you cover that Joe and Joe very well, so that almost all decisions have to be taken by consensus. And that's had a profound, and I think, permanent effect on what has been agreed in the negotiations. I think their second victory was in the 1990s. Us public opinion on climate change, and also the opinion of the Republican Party had not yet formed. It was not yet fully defined. These were these were early times. And I think these lobbies that we're talking about, they managed to define the terms of climate change in an anti action way through their attacks on basically undermining the science, which we saw, and also through this massive what we call now fake news misinformation campaign pre Coto and then after. And I think Kirsten and I both have newspaper clippings about that if you're interested later. And that was the second victory. The third victory was ensuring that the Kyoto Protocol was never ratified with the US. And I don't think that was a given. Yeah, I think that was a deliberate strategy which they succeeded in doing. And so overall, I think they have suggested in basically delaying Laying and diluting, and I think they have succeeded in that. They have not succeeded in destroying, but they have delayed and diluted in, in cahoots with Saudi Arabia and others very importantly.

Pilita Clarke: [00:27:49] And would you agree with that or.

Kirsty Hamilton: [00:27:51] Yeah. No, no, I think that is definitely the case. I mean, I would say one thing that they did very successfully was, you know, for a long time, maybe 1 or 2 decades, not at the negotiations per se, but around it was deliberately create doubt about the integrity of climate science. I mean, I worked in New Zealand for the first half of the 90s. I was also going to negotiations as well, but I was there and the industry lobby brought over. There were five very well-known climate denying scientists, and they were brought over in 1990, 91, 92, 94 and 95 with a deliberate intent to sow doubt on science. So they did that. Now that has been overcome. But that took a long time. And, you know, and there was an also a well publicized leak of a $2 million campaign deliberately to undermine climate science post Kyoto in the United States, where a sign of victory was that anyone promoting Kyoto would be seen as out of touch with reality. So I think that they've they've succeeded. But the thing is, they haven't succeeded, have they? Because we have, as people said in the earlier panel, we have got science integrity. Although there's been a difficult recent IPCC meeting, we have got the science integrity and foundation has been maintained. And I think, as others have said, implementation policies nationally have varied. But in total they have produced the kind of growth and renewable energy and solutions to climate change and shifts to some extent in the financial sector. So they have achieved some things, but they haven't won.

Tessa Khan: [00:29:32] Can I just add to that in terms of, I think, the evolution of the story that the fossil fuel industry has been trying to tell, as you said, I think in the 90s and for at least ten years after that, the focus was very much on undermining the science, on obfuscating facts, on creating doubt in people's minds about, you know, the extent to which there was a scientific consensus around climate change. I think what we're seeing now is a massive narrative push to position, accepting that climate change is real, that the oil and gas industry is going to be the one that drives the energy transition, and that that way they still manage to send to themselves in negotiations, in political and policy discussions. And, you know, their promise is that if you just let us evolve our businesses, we will lead you to the clean energy future that we all agree is necessary, when actually, what we've seen in the last few years is record profits by the oil and gas industry in the last three years, and a decision by them to double down on oil and gas production, to pay off their shareholders to pay down their debt and actually weaken their renewable energy targets to drop their investments in clean energy. So that is, I think, a very clear and useful, in my view, moment in that we now know exactly what we're dealing with. But the industry is going to be continuing to push this idea that you can't possibly pull your policy support for what we're doing. You can't leave us out of the room when you're talking about the way that we evolve our energy industry, because we're so central to how that will happen, and that clearly isn't true.

Tom : [00:31:05] So it's fairly sobering to acknowledge the challenge of this situation that we can't they can't exclude them. But the impact has obviously been very considerable. It's a tempting question to ask what kind of world we might live in, had they not had such a prominent role either, if you want to have a crack at that.

Christiana : [00:31:19] Yeah. I would like to ask a different question. What kind of a world would we have if they had actually done what they said they were going to do several years, which was to promote the energy transition. Let's just remember, there is a choice here. There is a very important critical choice that they have made, and they could have made a different choice.

Paul Dickinson: [00:31:48] I'm going to tell you about what happened when someone did make a different choice. And that was the great nation of China. And, you know, BYD launched a car just the other week that charges up 250 miles in five minutes. It's amazing this can be done. You know, renewables, energy have become incredibly cheap as a result of Chinese manufacturing. Genius. So in a certain sense, I would say we can sort of see to me that the answer to your question, Tom, is not having these debates about the science. You know, if the doctor goes to you and says, you know, you've got these terrible problems, the tests are saying, we've got a real problem. And then there's some enormous industry saying, oh, no, you haven't got a problem. Don't worry about it. Doctors are wrong. The scientists are the doctors, and I don't think we're ever going to be able to forgive the negative impact of of that betrayal of, of the trust in sort of rationality in the face of incredible risk.

Tom : [00:32:39] Yeah. Well, I hear you there. And the risk obviously is mounting all the time as we get closer and closer to tipping point. So I think what we need to do probably now is look at how the fossil fuel industry is trying to make their influence felt today, which is remains considerable. That has evolved from the historical perspective. Let's get into that after the break. Welcome back everyone. So just before the break, Tessa Khan highlighted the tactics and role of the fossil fuel lobby and how they've shifted over time as the international context has moved on. But they're still here and they're still having their voices heard. So let's start off with a clip in which Tessa speaks to some of the ways that these lobbies are continuing to influence decision makers today.

Pilita Clarke: [00:33:22] In the play, the the Don Perlman character actually is incredibly good at making changes in the actual documents in the decisions. Is that something that you think is still going on at cops today, or is in fact the fossil fuel lobbying tactics changed quite a bit since then?

Tessa Khan: [00:33:42] I think the fossil fuel lobby's tactics have evolved, their narratives have evolved, but I'd say the overall effect that they have, both at the multilateral and at the domestic level has stayed the same. So the fossil fuel lobby at the moment operates through multiple different realms. They have direct access to politicians. You know, the head of the oil and gas industry lobby. Their headquarters are a short stroll from Downing Street in the Houses of Parliament in the UK. There are members, dozens of members of Parliament who hold shares in fossil fuel companies. We also know that currently the industry realizes, especially now, that there is a government in the UK that is a little bit less susceptible, let's say an energy secretary in the UK that's a little bit less susceptible to direct lobbying by the industry. They're now very focused on shaping the information environment around decision makers and the people who influence them. That's something that the industry has always been very good at. I mean, as we've heard, they fund think tanks. They run advertisements. But, you know, at the moment they're sponsoring events by magazines that are on the soft left, that we know that Labour Party decision makers attend and pay attention to. They drop ads on podcasts that are listen to political influences. You know, they have very sophisticated ways of basically shaping the entire narrative ecosystem around decision makers so that it's more subliminal than their preferred method, which is just meeting with them behind closed doors. At this moment in the UK, that's a slightly less viable approach for, as I said, I think within the Energy Department, but they've got a whole range of other tactics that they're able to deploy.

Tom : [00:35:25] So, Paul, I think this takes us into your home territory, if I may. I mean, this is something that you are one of the world's deepest thinkers, I would actually say, on the ways in which corporate lobbying is affecting the policy development sphere. Or rather not, you know, not allowing it to develop. How do you see this space and how should we think about the role of corporate lobbying at this moment?

Paul Dickinson: [00:35:50] I mean, you know, there's this Brian Eno quote, there's no genius there. Genius. All I've ever had the opportunity to do is hang out with brilliant people. David Cureton wrote the book When Corporations Ruled the World, which I read and had a big impact on me. There's been a history of developing this kind of thing. You, Tom, when you were working at CDP, you led work to look at trade associations and how business used trade associations to try and influence policy.

Tom : [00:36:13] At Christiana Instruction. So that was that's that's where the whole thing comes.

Paul Dickinson: [00:36:16] Thank you Christiana. And why wouldn't you have done it? I'm just. But team it's a team. It's a team. But then, you know, that work has also been taken to another whole level. Bye bye. Friend of the show, Dillon Dylan Tanner and others who started the incredibly influential and influential bit of a pun, their incredibly effective NGO influence map that's been mapping. I was in a meeting just the other week where Ed Collins influence map showed how the gas industry globally has been used, unified messaging to try and make sure governments kind of go in the direction they want to go. Dylan was on the show lifelines versus deadlines with us. Fiona MacLean a miniseries, do look out for it. And some brilliant people like Senator Sheldon Whitehouse was on there. Naomi Oreskes so, so essentially what you know, we can all see that it's inexplicable that there would be humanity ignoring massive problems without this, this, this lobby effort. There really are far, far too many people to mention. And I think we all know it as well. You know, little kids know that the corporations have this enormous influence over us. The question is really how we organize ourselves against it, because it's so difficult to match those commercial resources, you know, the billions that are put on one side of the debate.

Paul Dickinson: [00:37:25] What do you do? There's a great little joke in the in the play where the intervals you remember, they say interval drinks are sponsored by BP and they are being ironic, but they're referring to the fossil fuel sponsorship of the arts. And, you know, just just one other thing I'd say here, which I think is incredibly important. The people in the industry need to recognize that this has to stop. You know, we're all I'm sorry to keep going on about it, but I'm desperately worried about fossil fuel authoritarianism. Some people I really admire are saying that we're in danger of sort of losing democracy in the United States. When you're filling up your car with gas, when you're flying long haul, when you've got, you know, your heater burning gas in your home, when you're cooking, you might be funding. There's nothing out of democracy. Just think about that for a minute. And that's, I think, the strongest argument for dealing with this, this overwhelming lobby.

Tom : [00:38:11] And I think, I mean, this isn't specifically related to the fossil fuel, but you talked about those early days when we were working at CDP on corporate disclosure of lobbying practices. And I remember, Paul, you and I went to see a very progressive business in London, the chief sustainability officer, and we walked in and and this person was giving us all of the details of all the great stuff they're doing and why there's a leader. And then one of us said, well, do you also realize that you are a member of the British Confederation of British Industry and that's a member of Business Europe in Brussels, and they are lobbying night and day against the legislation and regulation that you claim would support you. And his jaw hit the floor. Actually. So I think there's also a disconnect sometimes between corporations and what's being done through this lens of trade associations. And it's slightly different to fossil fuels, but it just illustrates how complicated it is.

Christiana : [00:38:56] True. But it's not complicated to understand where political financing for campaigns comes from. And that is particularly evident in the United States, where campaigns at all levels, at all levels, all electoral levels in city and states certainly national for the presidency or or for Capitol Hill seats are financed by the oil and gas industry at the price of loyalty if you get elected. And that has has been true for a long time and is just horribly true of this election that we have just went, oh my goodness

Paul Dickinson: [00:39:38] Yeah. And just a point on that. You know, there isn't any money to be made, you know, picking on transgender people. There isn't any money to be made picking on dirt and, you know, kind of opposing equality and inclusion. There isn't any money to be made even by deporting people, you know, illegal immigrants or whatever you want to call them. But but there is an opportunity for a perspective that wants to gain national political power to sow all of these prejudices together into a campaign and then say, drill, baby, drill. And so, you know, this question about what can people do? And I actually think one of the most important things you can do for climate change right now is to protect democracy, to keep the open society, to keep the universities open, to stop law firms being intimidated in every single level. I think the climate change fight, certainly in the United States right now is the democracy fight. And we shouldn't. We shouldn't be afraid to link the two of them. They're exactly the same thing right now.

Tom : [00:40:31] Yeah, I completely agree with your points about defense of democracy. Al Gore, great friend of the podcast, former guest, made similar comments to what you just said many times. And in fact, Christiana, I think you were just recently on stage with Al and Lawrence in Paris at the Climate Reality Training. And I believe next week we're going to have some substantive elements of that conversation. So Al and Lawrence will be back on the podcast next week.

Christiana : [00:40:56] And one of the levers to do that, Paul, is my current pet topic that we can hopefully move to, which is climate litigation.

Tom : [00:41:05] Absolutely. In our recent episode on climate mitigation, we looked at how the law can be used to hold polluters to account. And Tesla touched on what this might mean for fossil fuel companies.

Tessa Khan: [00:41:13] There's already a huge body of law that's developed that is sufficient to express, I think, a binding obligation on national Governments at a national level to take climate change seriously. And it's not just law that's been developed through the UN climate process, it's human rights law. It's all of the ways in which people's rights are affected by government inaction on climate change. So there have been dozens of lawsuits already brought against national governments to try to enforce more mitigation action, in particular in line with 1.5 degrees, and other ways in which you can determine a standard that governments have to meet in order to protect their citizens and residents within their country. So that's a really important body of litigation that's already developed and will continue, I think, to to gain momentum. On the other hand, there is also a huge amount of focus on the fossil fuel industry. And now we have science that makes it very clear the extent to which every single one of the carbon majors, the largest oil and gas companies, have contributed to the current concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, you can get down to a decimal point percentage in terms of demonstrating that responsibility.

Tessa Khan: [00:42:30] We also have science that can demonstrate exactly the extent to which climate change played a role in the escalating intensity of a cyclone, or a drought or a flood. And so I think increasingly, we are going to see efforts to draw a straight line between the actions of oil and gas companies, not just in emitting greenhouse gases, but also in stopping a global energy transition and doing everything in their power to lobby against that and the impacts that people are feeling right now. You know, we've just in the last couple of weeks, there's been a really important hearing in a German court in a case brought by a Peruvian farmer who lives in the Peruvian Andes. His village is at imminent threat of being flooded by glacial melt. And he's taking to court RWE, the biggest German energy company, Attributing basically €20,000 worth of damage on the basis of Iowa's contribution to climate change since the start of the Industrial Revolution. So there are all sorts of innovative legal tactics that are being developed to particularly pin accountability on the fossil fuel industry.

Pilita Clarke: [00:43:38] Yeah. And what about the Greenpeace loss in North Dakota just the other day? I mean, is that a worrying sign or is it an outlier? That doesn't necessarily mean anything.

Tessa Khan: [00:43:48] It's definitely not an outlier. It's an escalation of efforts that the fossil fuel industry has been undertaking for decades to silence environmental defenders and human rights defenders. And in countries like the Philippines and in Brazil, you know, that's extended to assassinating environmental defenders. This is a lawsuit in the US that's designed to bankrupt Greenpeace for, you know, totally baseless. But what these companies know is that if you're taking on an NGO and I say this as someone who runs an NGO, you know, all you have to do is tie them up in paperwork and court fees to divert their efforts from doing anything else. And that's a very effective way of shutting down public protest. And, you know, we call these lawsuits SLAPP suits because they are strategic lawsuits against public participation. They exist as a class, and it's really up to governments to regulate so that those sorts of lawsuits, which are clearly meant to intimidate and silence people, aren't allowed to proceed.

Tom : [00:44:45] Obviously, we recently did an episode all about this where we spoke to Laura Clark, the CEO of Client Earth, and we looked at the ways in which NGOs are using the law to hold fossil fuel companies to account. But there are also examples of it going the other way. And I think either of you want to share on the legal lever and how well it's being used in this arena.

Christiana : [00:45:04] Well, as we said in that discussion previously, we're still in our diaper stage of using climate litigation to hold companies accountable. But but it is coming. It is definitely coming. And companies I think, are getting more and more concerned about that, which is why they put more and more money into trying to prevent it. Exactly.

Paul Dickinson: [00:45:27] Yeah. And I think, you know, you could argue that these enormous lawsuits for damages, particularly from US states like California, have driven fossil fuel companies to get to the sort of very edge of reason in terms of their response to, to this challenge. But, I mean, it is working. And, you know, that famous overused phrase often attributed to Gandhi. You know, they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win. The fight has got really, really big. Yeah. And I just want to endlessly echo your comments, Christiana, when the house of cards does fall, that's the moment when we see the fingerprints of the fossil fuel industry on this. And litigation is actually a great way of, um, documenting actions and putting them on record because, you know, it may be that the lawsuit of 2025 doesn't necessarily succeed, but there might be enormous damages in 2035 paid based on the paperwork that was assembled in 2025.

Tom : [00:46:19] Okay, great. So I mean, fantastic, how wonderful to have this conversation and to be able to bring you, our wonderful listeners, this second part of the evening that we had at the Conduit Club last week after we all went to the play Kyoto. We have said it before, but to just say it again, this play is astonishing. It really is an enormous contribution and moves us forward. We would recommend everyone to go and see it. Since our podcast went out last week. I have no idea if you've influenced ticket sales, but I tried to get tickets to go and see it again and I couldn't get any more tickets, so I don't know if there's any left available, but if there are, I would encourage you to try and find them.

Christiana : [00:46:53] I tried to go for a second time because I really wanted to see it a second time, completely sold out. And so thanks to a couple of people backstage, I was squeezed in and I sat at the sound table because there was there was no real theatre seats available. And it it was actually quite a different perspective to see the sound engineer working away, standing because he had ceded his seat to me, and I was so much more aware of the amazing, amazing sound quality of that place. So whether you're there for the plot, whether you're there for the theatrics, whether you're there for the sound, it is really an amazing play. And they so deserve an award on Sunday.

Tom : [00:47:38] They so deserve an award.

Paul Dickinson: [00:47:40] Hold the mirror up to nature. That's what they did so perfectly.

Tom : [00:47:42] This is the first of three plays. So one on Kyoto, next on Copenhagen, which, as you said, I think to the shows when we were together, that sort of writes itself, Christiana, with the drama inherent.

Paul Dickinson: [00:47:51] No problem finding the dramatic arc.

Tom : [00:47:53] There. And then the third one on Paris, and I'm looking forward to seeing Christiana play herself at some point on the stage in the West End.

Paul Dickinson: [00:47:59] So I think Kyoto was tragedy and maybe Copenhagen is comedy. What would Paris would be?

Christiana : [00:48:05] Victory after a lot of work.

Tom : [00:48:10] All right. Thank you friends. Lovely to see you. Thanks for listening, everybody. We'll see you next week.

Christiana : [00:48:14] Bye bye.

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